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Abstract: The failure of psychiatry to validate its diagnostic constructs is 
often attributed to the prioritizing of reliability over validity in the structure 
and content of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). 
Here I argue that in fact what has retarded biomedical approaches to 
psychopathology is unwarranted optimism about diagnostic discrimination: the 
assumption that our diagnostic tests group patients together in ways that 
allow for relevant facts about mental disorder to be discovered. I consider 
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework as a new paradigm for 
classifying objects of psychiatric research that solves some of the challenges 




The architects of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1980), a 
task force of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), are often held to have sacrificed 
validity for reliability in constructing the manual’s categories (Sadler, Hulgus, and Agich 1994; 
Kendell and Jablensky 2003; Andreasen 2007). According to this view, the DSM went wrong 
when it adopted an operationalist stance focusing on atheoretical observational criteria, an 
ecumenical approach that made it easier to apply diagnoses consistently across practitioners and 
contexts. Without an understanding of etiology, the argument continues, the real contours of 
psychopathology have not been demarcated, and psychiatry has not been able to identify disease 
entities akin to those in the rest of medicine (Murphy 2006). This narrative implies that 
psychiatrists incorporated the operationalism of the DSM into their research methodology, and 
were accordingly inhibited or uninterested in the pursuit of causal explanations. The solution to 
psychiatry’s validity crisis, it has been suggested, is to refocus psychiatric research on causal 
mechanisms (Murphy 2006; Kendler 2011; Kendler et al. 2010).  
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 Here I argue that the DSM stands in the way of valid diagnostic categories not merely 
because it codifies test criteria that have not been validated, but also on account of its role in the 
research setting. Due to its widespread use in the framing of scientific hypotheses about mental 
disorder, the manual plays a central role in shaping the objects and methods of psychiatric 
inquiry. In particular, its diagnostic criteria are widely used to gather test populations for 
psychiatric studies. When the DSM is employed in this way, the implicit assumption is that the 
criteria for diagnosing clinical types can also successfully pick out populations about which 
relevant biomedical facts can be discovered. I will refer to this as the assumption of diagnostic 
discrimination. This assumption is only justified if there is reason to believe that patients meeting 
diagnostic criteria for a given disorder also share one or more experiential, neurological, genetic, 
or other abnormalities.  
 The first aim of this paper (constituting Section 2) is to make explicit the role of the 
assumption of diagnostic discrimination in psychiatric research, specifically when that research 
uses DSM criteria to gather test populations. I show that the assumption is implicitly rejected in 
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, a new classification tool for psychiatric 
researchers introduced by the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH). My second aim is to 
argue a pessimistic view of diagnostic discrimination, on historical and methodological grounds 
(Section 3). Finally I consider possible rebuttals for three of my claims: that there are no a priori 
grounds for optimism about diagnostic discrimination; that an alternative classification method 
would mitigate its risks; and that the assumption is ultimately such a bad one for researchers to 
make.   
2. What is the assumption of diagnostic discrimination? 
While the absence of valid categories in psychiatry is often noted, there is little consensus about 
what the term “validity” means in the psychiatric context. Olbert (unpublished) has identified 
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fourteen distinct uses of the term in the literature, and suggests that there are significantly more 
in operation. The usage of the term in psychometrics, from which the psychiatric usage has been 
developed, is no less fraught; one study identified one hundred and twenty-two different subtypes 
of validity (Newton and Shaw 2013). The term was originally applied to psychological tests, and 
was used to calibrate how well a test measured what it was intended to measure. Validity was 
originally evaluated through the correlation of test scores with other criteria, such as alternative 
test outcomes. A list of criteria that could establish the validity of these inferences about 
psychiatric kinds was introduced in Robins and Guze (1970) and updated in Kendler (1980). 
Andreasen (1995) introduced a “second structural program for the validation of psychiatric 
diagnosis” which incorporated validators from neuroscience, genetics, and the biomedical 
sciences. Such validators range from characteristic course and family aggregation to genetic 
abnormalities and neural mechanisms. 
 Since diagnostic categories can be said to be measurement instruments in only a loosely 
analogous sense (Blashfield and Livesley 1991), psychiatrists tend to speak of validity instead as an 
attribute of the inferences made through diagnosis about purported disease entities. Here I follow 
psychiatrists themselves in employing the term “valid” to refer to psychiatric constructs that 
“approximate reality.” Under the dominant biomedical paradigm in psychiatry, a valid 
diagnostic construct is one that categorizes patients who all share the same underlying 
physiological dysfunction. Critics of the DSM point out that none of the manual’s categories have 
yet been validated in this sense, in so far as no account of a complete causal pathway to a mental 
disorder has been empirically demonstrated (Kapur et al. 2012).  
 My question here does not concern whether psychiatric kinds are valid, but rather whether 
the categories of the DSM, when used as instruments to collect test populations for research 
purposes, successfully congregate patients about whom relevant facts can be gathered. Optimists 
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about this question are often committed to what I term the assumption of diagnostic discrimination, 
that is, the assumption that our diagnostic tests1 group patients together in ways that allow for relevant facts about 
mental disorder to be discovered. For the purposes of this discussion, relevant facts are those about the 
underlying mechanisms causing the signs and symptoms with which patients present. They are 
the sorts of facts that psychiatric researchers working in the biomedical sciences hope to find: 
genetic signatures, neurological or cognitive dysfunctions, focal brain lesions, and so forth. 
Diagnostic discrimination may be a more or less justified assumption for those interested in other 
sorts of inferences, as I will consider briefly in section 5.1.  
 I borrow the term “diagnostic discrimination” from psychometrics, where it is defined as the 
statistical assessment of how a diagnostic test compares with a gold standard, measured by the 
test’s specificity, sensitivity, predictive value, and likelihood ratios (Knottnerus and Buntix 2009, 
4). Discrimination in this sense is inapplicable in psychiatry, which lacks any authoritative tests 
that would allow for the assessment of the sensitivity or specificity of the DSM’s categories. In my 
argument it is invoked as an aspirational term, signifying an ideal rather than a measure. I am 
interested in the particular epistemic stance that evinces optimism about whether our diagnostic 
categories effectively group together patients homogeneous for the real objects of interest for 
biomedical psychiatry. The extent the DSM’s criteria are discriminative for the purposes of 
biomedical research is, of course, an empirical question, and diagnostic discrimination will surely 
vary across the manual’s constructs. My aim is not primarily to offer any empirical assessments, 
but rather to raise some concerns about the warrant for prima facie optimism about 
discrimination.  
                                                
1By “tests” I refer to either the diagnostic criteria of the DSM itself or diagnostic screens based on 
these criteria.  Obviously diagnostic discrimination could be proposed about other diagnostic 
methods (e.g., the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual) but my focus here is on the DSM. 
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 Unfortunately, careful attention to the problem of validity is entirely compatible with a naive 
commitment to diagnostic discrimination. Study designs that use DSM criteria to select research 
samples may assume that those samples will be homogeneous for certain sorts of pathogenic 
mechanisms.2 Even those profoundly dissatisfied with DSM categories may employ its criteria in 
order to locate latent constructs they hope to use to revise and perfect the manual. The DSM’s 
central role in the research context, specifically in guiding the selection of test populations and 
establishing targets for explanation, is not only entrenched by historical precedent but also held 
firm by the hand of the biomedical marketplace; funding bodies have traditionally preferred 
research that is directly pertinent to perceived clinical needs. This has led to a focus on the 
iterative validation of diagnostic constructs, especially the search for the causal mechanisms that 
can undergird new therapies.  
 In the following section I explore the role of diagnostic discrimination in the history of 
psychiatric research, and suggest that this history should lead us to be pessimistic about the 
assumption’s warrant. In my fourth section I will make the conceptual case against optimism 
about whether our diagnoses are discriminative, and consider an alternative tool for gathering 
test populations that does not rely on this risky assumption.  
3. The case for pessimism: a historical argument 
A valid taxonomy has historically been viewed as the first step in psychiatric research. Influential 
theorists of psychiatric validity have imagined a boot-strapping model, in which the first phase of 
achieving validity involves settling on a clinical description of diagnostic kinds (Kendell and 
                                                
2 Imagine a psychopharmaceutical study with a simple design in which drug response is tested in 
a clinical population of subjects sharing a diagnosis. If the assumption of diagnostic 
discrimination is in play, a 60% response rate will be interpreted as demonstrating that the drug 
is effective 60% of the time. Once the assumption is questioned, alternative hypotheses—such as 
that 60% of patients sharing a diagnosis share a specific underlying mechanism affected (with 
100% efficacy) by the drug—can be considered. 
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Jablensky 2003). Andreasen, for example, writes that only “once a reliable method is applied to 
define symptoms or delineate a potential diagnostic category or dimension of psychopathology” 
can “these variables then be validated by examining their relationship to external measures” 
(1995, 162). The DSMs have, historically, provided the independent variable for studies 
attempting to validate psychiatric kinds. 
 However, the origins of today’s diagnostic categories do not offer confidence that they will be 
discriminative in the relevant way. Despite the ideal of a scientifically objective system, 
psychiatric kinds are historically embedded concepts, traceable to different strata of the 
discipline’s past. The aim of the first edition of the DSM, published in 1952, was to collect 
statistical information. Throughout the history of the manual, ambitious task forces have 
attempted to revise the DSM’s categories on the basis of contemporary methods and knowledge, 
rather than in the terms of decades-old census projects and nineteenth-century theory. With 
somatic medicine as the benchmark, discriminative diagnoses were considered the ideal targets 
for validation by early advocates of the medical model in psychiatry (Klerman 1978); the 
architects of the DSM-III prioritized the construction of diagnostic categories based on “distilled 
clinical research experience” as the “first and crucial taxonomic step” (Feighner et al. 1972, 57) 
towards identifying valid constructs.  
 While Feighner et al. sought to reground psychiatric nosology on empirical foundations, their 
criteria (which formed the template for the DSM-III) were in fact an amalgam of data and 
received clinical intuition, with many of the basic taxonomic divisions being inherited 
unchallenged (Kendler 2009). Similarly, the main architects for the most recent revision, the 
DSM-5, announced the need to “transcend the limitations of the current DSM paradigm” so 
that the new DSM could provide research criteria “not constrained by the requirements of the 
neo-Kraepelinian categorical approach currently adopted” (Kupfer, First, and Regier 2008, xxii). 
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In the end, however, with some exceptions (such as the reconfiguration of subtypes of autism on a 
spectrum and the removal of subtypes for schizophrenia) the nosological structure remained 
relatively stable.  
 Since the DSM is primarily intended to serve a clinical population, it makes sense that latent 
constructs postulated but not demonstrated by biomedical researchers would be excluded. Until 
theories about underlying mechanisms can be correlated with signs and symptoms that present in 
the clinic (either behaviorally or as the result of testing), they are irrelevant to the task of 
diagnosing patients. As it stands, the biologization of psychiatric research has not led to the 
discovery of any laboratory markers for specific psychiatric conditions, and there remain no 
biological screens for psychopathology—only the checklists of the DSM itself, and the tests that 
are based on its operationalizations (Kapur 2012). Decades of research into psychiatric and 
behavioral genetics have failed to turn up genes specific to particular disorders (though the 
heritability of types of psychopathology has been demonstrated [Merikangas and Risch 2003]) or 
neurological markers (despite advances in our understanding of the neurological underpinnings 
of signs and symptoms [Gillihan and Parens 2011]). The pharmaceutical industry has capitalized 
on optimism about a one-to-one correspondence between diagnosis, condition, and treatment; 
notable here is the historic relabeling of treatments specific to symptoms (e.g., “tranquilizers”) as 
treatments specific to purported disease entities (e.g., “antipsychotics”). In spite of this, the 
heterogeneity of diagnostic profiles is matched by the heterogeneity of patient response to 
treatment. Nearly all psychopharmaceutical interventions are nonspecific, and none come close 
to working for all patients sharing a diagnosis, which would allow the DSM to be redrawn along 
the lines of what Radden has called “drug cartography” (2003).  
 All in all, neither the history of the manual nor the current state of the art in biomedical 
psychiatry can support the assumption of diagnostic discrimination. In the next section I argue 
Tabb 8 
that the structure of the DSM also gives reasons for pessimism, drawing on criticisms made by a 
growing number of psychiatric researchers that their disappointing failure to validate the DSM’s 
constructs is due to the fact that there is nothing for them to validate. Or, to put these judgments 
about the ontology of psychiatric kinds in my own epistemological terms: the diagnostic tests for 
psychiatric constructs are not discriminative in the relevant sense, in so far as little of interest 
from the perspective of biomedicine can be discovered about patients sharing a diagnosis beyond 
the recognition that they all present with (some of) the very signs and symptoms that constitute 
their diagnosis.  
4. The case for pessimism: a conceptual argument 
The first thing to be noted about the DSM’s structure is that if etiopathogenic facts about mental 
disorders are forthcoming, they will not stand in simple causal relationships to the signs and 
symptoms that act as diagnostic criteria. As of its third edition the DSM’s categories have been 
polythetic, requiring patients to present with only n symptoms out of a longer list in order to meet 
the threshold for a given disorder. The diversity of patients within each class is increased further 
because screens for psychopathology tend to have low thresholds, since the cost of a false-
negative (abandoning a patient in need of care) is viewed as higher than a false-positive (giving 
unneeded treatment) (Ross 2014). This has allowed diagnostic criteria to cast wider nets, and for 
reliability to be improved. But as a result, the DSM’s criteria allow for incredible diversity. For 
example, the DSM-5 permits patients to be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder if they 
present with any one of 636,120 possible combinations of symptoms (Olbert et al., 2014). This 
may mean that patients sharing diagnosis have a range of underlying pathologies that cause these 
related but distinct manifestations. Relevant facts will explain this diversity either by revealing 
homogeneity beneath promiscuous clinical descriptions, or by ultimately arriving at disjunctive 
accounts of the mechanisms that undergird them. The likelihood of the former across psychiatric 
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diagnoses is doubtful, given the relative rarity of single causes underlying distinct clinical 
presentations in somatic medicine (Olbert, unpublished). In cases of the latter, the heterogeneity 
of conspecifics that make up DSM-derived research samples could hamper progress towards a 
discovery of these diverse mechanisms.  
 Some amount of symptomatic variation is frequently found among patients sharing a 
diagnosis in other types of disease, such as cancer or lupus, so heterogeneity on its own does not 
prove that the DSM’s diagnoses are not discriminative. But the lack of compelling confirmations 
of psychiatry’s taxonomic boundaries by genetics, epidemiology, neurophysiology, and other 
allied sciences is worrying, raising the question of whether the manual is useful for anything more 
than identifying phenotypic clusters (Meehl 1986). Turning to the DSM’s use in the research 
setting, initial hopes that “zones of rarity” among diagnoses would emerge through the discovery 
of underlying mechanisms have not yet been fulfilled (Kendell and Jablensky 2003). Taxometric 
and epidemiological studies reveal that the enormous heterogeneity in symptoms and course 
actually contain recognizable sub-types that appear more frequently than others; however, 
underlying differences in causal pathways or mechanisms that could explain these trends have 
not been found (Nandi, Beard, and Galea 2009).  
 Recently, a new round of critics has suggested that the heterogeneity of test populations 
collected on the basis of DSM diagnostic criteria undermines these sorts of discoveries in 
psychopathology. Some believe that the best response would be to do away with diagnostic 
constructs as targets for validation (Hyman and Fenton 2003; Merikangas and Risch 2003). 
Their view is that explanations that facilitate intervention and recovery are better found at other 
levels—for example, the level of the symptom, the gene, or the neural mechanism. Sanislow et al. 
have written that “dependence on conventional nosologies leaves the enterprise of understanding 
mechanisms of psychopathology in the awkward position of assuming the validity of single 
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disorders and organizing research accordingly” (Sanislow et al. 2010, 2). In fact, validity is not 
assumed in such cases—the soundness of inferences about the diagnostic construct is not taken 
for granted, but rather is the object of investigation. What Sanislow et al. are reacting to is the 
assumption of diagnostic discrimination—the assumption that populations delineated by DSM 
categories are ripe for validation according to current biomedical standards.  
 This line of criticism is a reaction to cases like that described by Steven Hyman who, as the 
director of the NIMH in the late 1990s, became aware of and increasingly frustrated by the lack 
of research into treatments for the cognitive deficits of schizophrenia, among the most difficult 
and damaging symptoms experienced by patients. Hyman describes realizing that the lack of 
interest in cognitive symptoms was due to the bottleneck put on research by the DSM’s 
diagnostic criteria, since cognitive deficits were not included in the manual. “Given the status of 
the DSM-IV criteria as the community consensus,” Hyman writes of that time, “the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) held that it could not, by itself, recognize the cognitive 
symptoms of schizophrenia as an indication for the development and approval of new 
treatments” (Hyman 2010, 157). Recently, the DSM-5 Task Force has justified the continued 
lack of inclusion of cognitive symptoms quite explicitly, on the grounds that “cognition may not 
be useful as a differential diagnosis tool.”3  
 Hyman’s worry is that a vicious cycle is produced by the role of the DSM in research, such 
that the exclusion of a symptom (like cognitive deficit) from the manual for clinical reasons leads 
to the suppression of precisely the kind of research that would make its saliency for psychiatric 
practice clear. With his colleagues at the NIMH, Hyman began to construct a classification 
system for research that would allow scientists to apply for funding from the Institute without 
structuring their studies around DSM categories. Under the Research Domain Criteria rubric, 
                                                
3 http://www.DSM5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/proposedrevision.aspx?rid=411#. 
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psychiatric investigators present their experiments as targeting fundamental components of 
mental functioning (or “research domains”) that are drawn from allied sciences, instead of using 
DSM constructs. Research domains contribute one axis to the matrix that the NIMH has 
proposed for organizing psychiatric research, which is sub-divided into more specific 
“constructs”—for example, “reward valuation,” “performance monitoring,” or “attachment 
formation and maintenance.” The other axis is “units of analysis,” ranging from “genes” to 
“behavior.”4  
 By encouraging the funding of research that investigates certain research domains at certain 
units of analysis, the RDoC changes the targets of validation from “clinical endpoints that have 
remained unchanged for decades” (Hyman and Fenton 2003, 351) to any sort of phenomenon 
relevant to psychopathology that may be viewed either as an extreme on a spectrum of human 
variation or as a dysfunctional structure or process. What is at stake with this new approach is the 
longstanding contention that psychiatry’s scientific targets are best located through the same 
classificatory tools as those deployed in clinical practice. Rather than seeking to replace the DSM 
as a diagnostic manual, RDoC works as a classification protocol for researchers. It aims to 
encourage a profound shift in the way research samples are conceived of and assembled. In some 
cases, the translational approaches encouraged by the NIMH require the study of mechanisms 
that cut across traditional diagnostic categories. Now, instead of relying on DSM categories to 
gather research populations, RDoC researchers may gather whatever populations are pertinent 
to their domain of interest.  
 This method facilitates the roundabouts researchers have always used to precisify generic 
diagnostic screens to meet their own needs (Meehl 1986; Kutschenko 2011a). Test populations 
                                                
4 The matrix also includes a column for “paradigms,” which are not units of analysis but rather 
scientific methods, frameworks, or tasks that are of use in the study of a particular construct. 
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need not even manifest homogeneous psychopathological symptoms, and indeed one of the aims 
of RDoC is to allow for the inclusion of patients typically ignored in research because they fall 
into a “not otherwise specified” category, as well as patients who show signs of mental distress but 
are below the threshold for diagnosis. So, for example, a group researching fear circuitry (construct 
of interest: fear/acute threat; domain: negative valence systems; unit: circuits) might use as their test 
population patients seeking medical help for anxiety, regardless of whether they meet any specific 
diagnostic criteria.5  
 The RDoC project avoids the pitfall of prematurely assuming diagnostic discrimination, 
although, as I discuss in Section 5.3, it still relies on other types of discrimination that may be 
faulty. Of interest here is that in order to liberate psychiatric research from the constraints of an 
unhelpful taxonomy, the NIMH has placed its bets for discrimination of research targets beyond 
the pages of the DSM. Debates over which sorts of objects are most worthy of study may 
continue to be played out under the RDoC through the distribution of funding dollars, but these 
judgments will be constrained by current epistemological and methodological commitments 
rather than nosological tradition. In contrast, when the DSM is used to design experimental 
protocols and present them to funding bodies it can act as a bottleneck, restricting research that 
cross-cuts or challenges existing diagnostic boundaries and excluding innovative explanatory 
approaches. If the DSM’s categories are discriminative in the relevant sense, such a narrowing of 
focus is a boon to research. If not, the DSM is analogous to the lamppost in the tale of the man 
who makes the mistake of looking for his keys where the light is, instead of where he lost them.  
 
                                                
5 This example is borrowed from the NIMH’s online materials about the RDoC—see 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/nimh-research-domain-criteria-
rdoc.shtml#toc_studies for the full example. Accessed 6/18/14. 
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5. In defense of optimism 
I have argued that the DSM may retard progress in psychiatry not merely by codifying and 
enforcing diagnoses that may not be valid, but also by limiting the abilities of researchers to make 
original valid inferences about the nature of psychiatric disorder.6 This effect is due to the widely-
held but, I have argued, unjustified assumption in psychiatry that the manual’s categories are the 
appropriate grounds on which to draw test populations for research purposes. In this section I 
consider three possible objections to my argument. The first is that if warrant for belief in 
diagnostic discrimination cannot be found in the DSM’s history or biomedical psychiatry’s track 
record, it can be found in clinical practice. The second is that some assumptions about 
discrimination must be made, and that the bottlenecking effects that these assumptions have on 
progress are a necessary cost of doing science. The third is that by giving up on validating the 
DSM’s categories, psychiatry would lose track of its true targets, making the assumption of 
diagnostic discrimination a prerequisite for psychiatric research.  
5.1 The Clinical Case for Diagnostic Discrimination 
 It has been assumed that if clinicians are able to separate patients into discrete kinds based on 
their symptomology there is good reason to anticipate that scientific validators will ultimately 
reinforce these divisions (Robins and Guze 1970). However, it seems that many clinicians 
themselves do not believe that the DSM accurately taxonomizes their patients. Studies of the 
actual usage of the manual suggest that clinicians find it primarily helpful for securing treatment 
options, and mostly ignore its complex polythetic structure (First and Westen 2007). Practitioners 
engage in diagnostic “bracket creep” to tweak coverage benefits and duck the restrictions that 
                                                
6 There are, of course, countless other powerful bottlenecks on psychiatric progress, among them 
that the brain is far more complex than other medical objects and that explanations of 
psychopathology from a biomedical perspective may well always be (to a greater degree than 
elsewhere in medicine) incomplete without contributions from psychology, the social sciences, 
and even the humanities. 
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insurance companies put on their ability to utilize their expert judgment (Bowker and Star 1999). 
Ethnographic research reveals that diagnoses often follow after treatment, rather than guiding it 
(Whooley 2010, 461). If the manual’s ubiquity in clinical practice is due to its integral role in the 
larger machinery of industrial and corporate healthcare, rather than its accurate representation 
of clinical types, any argument for diagnostic discrimination on these grounds is unsound.  
 Further evidence that the manual’s diagnostic constructs do not accurately represent clinical 
concepts of disorder comes from the widespread alarm over the deprecation of the experience of 
the patient due to the DSM’s reductive approach to description (Andreasen 2007). The DSM’s 
operationalized descriptions neglect the fact that “in addition to manifesting the relatively direct 
consequences of neurobiological abnormalities,” patients “react to their abnormalities in all kinds 
of ways that may sometimes require the categories of meaning and experience in order to be 
understood or explained” (Sass, Parnas, and Zahavi 2011, 16). Some phenomenologically-
oriented clinicians and philosophers of psychiatry have suggested that these experiential aspects 
of mental illness that should themselves be targets for validation (Mishara and Schwartz 2010). 
Ipseity disturbance, for example, has been used to differentiate schizophrenia-spectrum disorders 
from other forms of psychosis (Henriksen and Parnas 2012; Parnas et al. 2005). Taken together, 
these criticisms suggest that the DSM categories do not reflect the clinical picture sufficiently to 
justify optimism about their utility in the research setting.  
5.2 The inevitability of diagnostic discrimination  
Another possible objection is that the assumption of discrimination is inevitable in psychiatric 
investigation, and that the DSM is not (uniquely) culpable. Studies dividing subjects into groups 
must be always depend on tests assumed to be discriminative for the construct in question. 
Strategies like RDoC, it could be argued, simply replace the diagnostic constructs of the DSM 
with other sorts of constructs, in this case the sub-categories of its proposed domains. The validity 
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of these constructs can surely also be challenged, and the organization of research methods and 
practices in accordance with them could also be restrictive.  
 My aim is not to dismiss the importance of discrimination in psychiatric research, nor to 
suggest that psychiatry can or should do without constructs altogether, but rather to challenge the 
assumption that the DSM’s criteria are discriminative for research purposes. While the RDoC 
also relies on constructs, its architects have emphasized that these constructs are, first, completely 
open to revision and, second, explicitly designed to be broad enough to include the major 
paradigms currently at play within psychiatric research today. If the NIMH does not fulfill its 
promise to amend and expand the matrix’s research domain criteria in accordance with shifts in 
the field, it could well end up with calcified categories that restrict research in the way that the 
DSM’s categories have.  
 Notably, RDoC does not limit the conceivable objects of psychiatric research, which are not 
the same as the loci on the matrix at which the research falls. Rather than taxonomizing objects 
for psychiatric investigation, RDoC arranges domains of functioning in which such objects are 
located, providing for each a consensus definition and orienting researchers towards the available 
measures or elements across the units of analysis that could be used as variables for gathering 
populations for studies.7 Accordingly, researchers have a significant amount of autonomy in the 
design of their research. As in all scientific research, their choice of construct and the tests they 
use to measure for it should be scrutinized closely by their peers.  
5.3 The value of diagnostic kinds for psychiatric research 
A final objection worth considering is whether giving up on diagnostic kinds is worth it—whether 
the gains to research productivity that would come from having discriminative targets have too 
high an epistemological or ethical cost. It can be argued that keeping psychiatry focused on 
                                                
7 http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-MH-11-005.html 
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diagnostic kinds is the best way to avoid the reduction of the mentally ill to their component 
parts, which neglects the phenomenological core of psychopathology (McLaren 2011; Walter 
2013). Thus there is a risk that the NIMH’s own assumptions about the proper targets for 
psychiatric explanation may be crippling, potentially becoming (in Hyman’s evocative term for 
the DSM) another “unintended epistemic prison” (Hyman 2010, 157).  
 The NIMH has made little secret of its preference for analysis at the level of brain circuits, 
based on the reasoning that it is at this level that science is most rapidly gaining insight into the 
underlying correlates of behavior (Insel et al. 2010). However, this approach has garnered 
accusations that the RDoC is “mindless” (Frances 2013), that is, symptomatic of “the profession’s 
intent to complete its abandonment of the mind as the localization and source of our suffering” 
(Greenberg 2013, 342). In response Bolton (2013) has argued that the NIMH’s claim that “all 
mental diseases are brain diseases” need not be reductionistic insofar as the brain can be seen as 
integrated into a complex network of causal relations that extend beyond the individual. Other 
advocates of the RDoC framework suggest it might give empirical grounding to 
psychotherapeutic as well as pharmotherapeutic approaches (Morris and Cuthbert 2012, 31). 
However, especially in light the NIMH’s increasingly enthusiastic pursuit of basic science even as 
“fundamental and important questions regarding health services, psychosocial treatments, 
conceptual issues, public health, and patient initiatives remain marginally funded” (Sadler 2013, 
29), it remains to be seen whether the NIMH will be truly ecumenical in the distribution of 
research dollars across the columns of their matrix.  
 The RDoC project’s purported reductionism differs in an important way from the epistemic 
bottleneck of the DSM, however, insofar as it increases the conceptual and methodological 
distance between the laboratory and the clinic rather than collapsing it. If the pretense is 
abandoned that psychiatry’s scientific and practical objects are one and the same, the fits and 
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starts of the NIMH’s descriptive project need not immediately impact clinical nosology, nor need 
its reductive approach be directly imported into clinical practice. Solomon has argued that while 
expert disagreement can be generative in science, the value of stable consensus is higher in 
medicine, where the loss of epistemological authority can be dangerous (Solomon 2014). Her 
claims are vindicated by the widely expressed view that even the minor modifications of 
diagnostic categories found in each new edition of the DSM can be greatly harmful to patients 
(Frances 2009). As Schaffner has suggested, clinical research might continue to make progress on 
refining our understanding of psychopathology at “higher levels of aggregation” while projects 
facilitated by the RDoC framework work to reveal the complex and diverse “many-many 
relations” that make validity such a challenge (Schaffner 2012, 184). However, if the DSM stops 
playing its role as an epistemic hub (Kutschenko 2011b), the integration of psychiatric knowledge 
into therapeutics will need to be re-imagined—a project well beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. Conclusion: Implications for Philosophy of Psychiatry  
Diverse metaphysical orientations about the nature of the kindhood of diagnostic kinds are 
compatible with the assumption of diagnostic discrimination. Debates among philosophers of 
psychiatry over psychiatric kinds have focused on appraising these possible metaphysical stances, 
and there has recently been much effort to resolve the metaphysical nature of psychiatric kinds 
(Kincaid and Sullivan 2014). Insofar as the objects of diagnostic tests can be seen as either 
theoretical constructs or real entities, both realists and instrumentalists can beg the question of 
whether the DSM’s diagnostic criteria are indeed discriminative. This project has distracted 
philosophers from the fact that optimism about the discrimination of the diagnostic criteria may 
not, in some or all cases, be warranted. We have no reason to doubt that diagnostic 
discrimination varies across the DSM’s categories, rendering as ill formed the question of 
whether psychiatric kinds are natural, human, practical, constructed, etc. Since psychiatrists are 
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increasingly pursuing piecemeal causal explanations about constructs below the level of the 
diagnostic construct, they should follow Kincaid (2008) in leaving the question of diagnostic 
kindhood behind. Instead, philosophers can investigate the ways in which psychiatry stabilizes its 
diverse objects of research across disciplinary boundaries in the absence of the DSM’s 
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